Berlin Diary: For A Democratic Culture

Monday, September 29, 2008

posted under , , , , by Unit for Criticism
Written by Michael Rothberg, Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory

Greetings from Berlin, where I’m spending several months of my sabbatical. Among other things, I hope to use my time here to provide an outside-the-US perspective on some of the questions of theory, culture, and politics that concern us at Kritik and at the Unit for Criticism. I composed the following thoughts before reading the excellent forum around the work of Roberto Dainotto, but this post might be taken as part of a further thinking of “Europe,” here observed from a slightly different—and perhaps more optimistic—angle.

Berlin is an extraordinary city in many ways, and it’s impossible not to be fascinated by the intensive layering of histories that characterizes it. This layering is especially obvious when you move through the city on a bicycle, the preferred means of transportation. Within a few minutes you can pass from West to East, riding over the site of the former wall and moving from a reconstructed city-center-cum-mall like Potsdamer Platz through the late eighteenth-century Brandenburg Gate and on to the former East Germany’s main drag, Unter den Linden. On the way, you pass Peter Eisenman’s recently constructed Holocaust memorial, the new American embassy, and government buildings like the Reichstag, a late nineteenth-century colossus topped with a beautiful Norman Foster-designed glass dome. If you continue down Unter den Linden, you’ll come to the Humboldt University, where Hegel lectured and Du Bois studied, and the Pergamon Museum, which houses an enormous altar taken from what is now Turkey. And that’s just one small, albeit central, part of the city.


[Peter Eisenman's "Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe"]

What is most interesting to me about Berlin, however, goes beyond architecture: it has to do with the particular intellectual culture one finds here. At its best, the city’s intellectual life represents a kind of critical and reflective embodiment of the historical layering one finds in the urban environment.


[Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum, with the East German television tower in the background]

Let me give an example. A couple of weeks ago I attended a small conference on “Antisemitism in the Context of Migration and Racism.” The outgrowth of a study on this topic by the group “amira”—a research project sponsored by Berlin’s Verein für Demokratische Kultur e.V. [Association for Democratic Culture]—the conference was primarily directed at social workers involved with migrant youth (of primarily Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab background). The conference itself featured academics, activists, and civil servants as well as social workers and teachers of varied ages and backgrounds, and consisted of a day of presentations, discussions, and workshops. As all involved agreed, the topic of the study itself is a sensitive one—the alleged presence of antisemitism among young minorities who themselves suffer daily the effects of racism, poverty, and marginalization. Many expressed discomfort with the possible impact of such a discussion in a moment of heightened anti-Muslim racism (or “Islamophobia,” as it’s come to be called by some), in Germany and elsewhere. Personaly, I was never fully convinced of the premise of the event—i.e. that a problem exists that is best addressed in terms of particular ethnicized populations, as opposed to at a more holistic, societal level.

Yet, despite these apparent shortcomings, the conference struck me as successful. It created the space for a complex, searching discussion that brought together many layers of the social topography of the city, the country, and indeed the “new” Europe as a whole. It moved back and forth between the most practical questions of pedagogy and more conceptual issues about how to frame the problems of antisemitism and racism in a society both fractured and held together by a diverse population.

As a scholar, I was particularly struck by the degree to which the discussion confronted what I have come to call “multidirectional memory”—the fact that collective memories circulate between social groups and that those groups do not maintain unique possession of “their own” pasts. Remembrance is a social process in which disparate histories intersect, catalyze, and shape each other; it is not, despite what is often believed, a zero-sum game defined by scarce resources. At the “amira” conference, the discussion turned again and again to the relation between different histories of suffering and to the non-obvious but necessary question of how to adjudicate between them. It was not a “competition of victims” but a multidirectional confrontation with the past and present of a stratified and layered social situation—a “post-National Socialist” context, as one of the participants called it, that is also analogous to, but not identical with, postcolonial contexts in other European countries. It was a confrontation that involved addressing delicate questions of “speaking for others” and “speaking as an X,” but somehow it also seemed to avoid the particularly American problem of identity politics and the moralization of the political that too often accompanies it.

As is often the case—but perhaps even more so when one is out of one’s most familiar element and questions of translation are unavoidable—I found myself listening from a double perspective. As I, along with the other audience members and participants, reflected on the topic at hand—the situation in Berlin today—I kept thinking at the same time about another context: the United States. I thought in particular about the name of the event’s sponsoring agency—the “Association for Democratic Culture.” That, I thought, is precisely what we need in America: a renewal of democratic culture. Although my thinking of late has certainly been influenced by the sorry state of electoral politics in the US, I was not, obviously, thinking of the Democratic Party. I was thinking instead of what the conference set in motion: a multidirectional confrontation with history and actuality that was free of excess pathos, resentment, and accusation, and that took place in a context of reasonable disagreement and debate.

I don’t want to idealize the situation in Germany by any means; the very fact that it is still necessary (as it most definitely is) to talk about antisemitism and racism more than sixty years “after Auschwitz,” a half century after the first “guestworkers” arrived, and almost two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall indicates that democratic pedagogy has not been as fully successful here as it might sometimes seem. But it is precisely the decades of confronting its own racist past that has made Germany—and Berlin in particular—a space where serious and non-reductive conversations about social injustice and intersecting histories can take place, at least occasionally, in the public sphere.

What will it take to build that kind of self-critical democratic culture in the United States?
Read more

Between Fear and Sanctuary

Monday, July 7, 2008

posted under , , , , , , by Unit for Criticism
Written by Kevin Healey, Institute for Communications Research

Editor's Note: This post is part of a summer-long series that includes the writing of Kevin Healey (Communications) and Martha Webber (English) as they attend Cornell's SCT (School of Criticism and Theory) during the summer of 2008. As always, feel free to join the conversation.
.

This week in SCT we discussed Jan Gross’s Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz (2007). Gross’s previous book, Neighbors, caused serious debate across the political spectrum in Poland, and Fear provoked a similar reaction. Poles are highly sensitive about their nation’s history of anti-Semitism, for reasons that Fear brings clearly into focus. While anti-Semitism existed prior to World War II in Poland (and indeed throughout Europe, a fact well-documented by Saul Friedlander), its persistence after the war is especially troubling. As Gross explains in often excruciating detail, the Polish city of Kielce was the site of the worst post-WWII pogrom in Europe. The author’s main task in Fear is to address the simple question: How could such events have taken place after the war had ended?

In our seminar, Carolyn Dean reminded us repeatedly that Gross’s attempt to answer this question makes Fear an extremely unusual historical work (if it remains within the disciplinary bounds of history at all). Rather than trying to establish causal explanations through the weight of evidence, Gross proceeds instead through a process of elimination. The usual explanations—the myth of blood libel, the idea that the Jews supported communism—simply do not stand up to the weight of evidence. So we are left with what Gross considers the best explanation we have: to paraphrase Tacitus (as Gross does), we hate those whom we have hurt. Poles benefitted materially from the persecution of their Jewish neighbors by appropriating possessions ranging from blankets to houses. The fear that Gross refers to is the fear that Poles have of themselves and their neighbors, in light of the guilty knowledge of their own past actions. This fear led to the need to eliminate its source, in the form of violent massacres that spread like wildfire through Kielce.

But Gross goes a step further in his proposed explanation...


and here is where Dean is most suspicious: in his conclusion, Gross cites the chimpanzee research of Jane Goodall, who described the capacity of chimps to treat members of their own community not merely as outsiders but as an enemy species. In an extended footnote, Gross cites an account of a community of chimps who split apart and subsequently engaged in violent, murderous aggression toward one another. Goodall describes the process as “pseudospeciation,” and Gross appropriates this evolutionary insight in his own explanation of the pogrom of Kielce. In our seminar, Dean bracketed this explanation as something that seems out of place in a work of history—an explanation undeserving of serious consideration. Most of my fellow seminarians appeared to agree.

I’ll pose 2 questions for consideration, only the first of which follows directly from the above summary.

1. Why not take Gross’s psycho-analytical approach—including his reference to Jane Goodall’s chimpanzee research—more seriously?

Clearly Gross takes it very seriously. He structures his entire argument to lead up to it. And while he acknowledges that he cannot provide concrete evidence for such an analysis, he suggests that this is the best explanation we have at the moment. Dean’s concerns seem to revolve around the disciplinary bounds of history. But Gross clearly intends his work to reach a wide audience—especially those Poles whose conscience he wishes to shake. Since he begins with a simple question—“Why Kielce?”—his work proceeds in whatever manner can address this question. Should we reject this kind of explanation simply because it is difficult—if not impossible—to prove by the usual historical methods?

2. How should we think about representations of victimhood that involve animals?

I pose this question after visiting the Farm Sanctuary, which is located near Ithaca, NY, where our seminar is held. The Farm Sanctuary rescues abused and neglected animals—mostly from factory farms—and nurses them back to health. I thought I was taking a detour from my studies when we visited the Sanctuary, but I was struck by the resemblance of their introductory video to the Holocaust documentaries we’ve been discussing in class. The video portrays the terrible conditions of factory farm animals, focusing on several animals in particular who are presented as friends of the Sanctuary family. Gross’s reference to Jane Goodall’s chimpanzee research made the “dots” beg for a connection, since his footnote includes a similarly personalized narrative of one chimp, Goliath, who was viciously beaten by members of his own community.

What connections should we make, if any, between these issues? That is, between Jan Gross, Jane Goodall, and the Farm Sanctuary? How do we make such connections without belittling the memory of the Holocaust? Political theorists like Martha Nussbaum have written extensively on the moral imperative to recognize the dignity of animals (see especially Frontiers of Justice). But how do we differentiate between these issues in a way that is morally responsible?
Read more

top